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Abstract—This work proposes a novel approach to infer and
characterize Internet-scale DNS amplification DDoS attacks by
leveraging the darknet space. Complementary to the pioneer
work on inferring Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) activities
using darknet, this work shows that we can extract DDoS
activities without relying on backscattered analysis. The aim
of this work is to extract cyber security intelligence related
to DNS Amplification DDoS activities such as detection period,
attack duration, intensity, packet size, rate and geo-location
in addition to various network-layer and flow-based insights.
To achieve this task, the proposed approach exploits certain
DDoS parameters to detect the attacks. We empirically evaluate
the proposed approach using 720 GB of real darknet data
collected from a /13 address space during a recent three months
period. Our analysis reveals that the approach was successful in
inferring significant DNS amplification DDoS activities including
the recent prominent attack that targeted one of the largest
anti-spam organizations. Moreover, the analysis disclosed the
mechanism of such DNS amplification DDoS attacks. Further,
the results uncover high-speed and stealthy attempts that were
never previously documented. The case study of the largest DDoS
attack in history lead to a better understanding of the nature
and scale of this threat and can generate inferences that could
contribute in detecting, preventing, assessing, mitigating and even
attributing of DNS amplification DDoS activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
A DDoS attack is one of the major cyber attacks that
attempts to make a computer or network resources unavailable.
DDoS activities, indeed, dominate today’s attack landscape. In
a recent report by Arbor Networks [1], it was concluded that
48% of all cyber threats are DDoS. Governmental organiza-
tions, corporations as well as critical infrastructure were also
recently deemed as DDoS victims [2]. A DNS amplification
attack is a form of DDoS that relies on the use of publi-
cally accessible open recursive DNS servers to overwhelm a
victim system with DNS response traffic [3]. A recent event
demonstrated that even a cyber security organization became
a victim of the largest (i.e., 300 Gbps) DNS amplification
DDoS attack in history [4]. The above facts concur that DDoS
attacks in general, and DNS amplification in particular, are
and will continue to be a significant cyber security issue,
causing momentous damage to a targeted victim as well
as negatively affecting, by means of collateral damage, the
network infrastructure (i.e., routers, links, etc.), the finance, the
trust in, and the reputation of the organization under attack.
In this work, we tackle the following questions: 1) How to
infer large-scale DNS amplification DDoS activities? 2) what
are the characteristics of DNS amplification DDoS attacks?
and 3) what inferences can we extract from analyzing DNS
amplification DDoS traces?
In this context, we frame this paper’s contributions as
follows:
• Proposing a systematic flow-based approach for infer-
ring DNS amplification DDoS activities by leveraging
DNS queries to darknets.
• Characterizing the inferred DNS amplification DDoS
threats during a recent 3 months period.
• Analyzing traces from the largest DNS amplification
Attack of March 2013 [5] and uncovering the mecha-
nism behind them.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we survey the related work. In Section III, we provide an
overview and background information on DNS amplification
attacks and darknet space. In Section IV, we present the
proposed approach and elaborate on various aspects of its com-
ponents. In Section V, we empirically evaluate the approach
and disclose a case study on the largest DNS amplification
DDoS attack. In Section VI, we discuss the lessons learned.
Finally, Section VII summarizes the paper and discusses the
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
First, the use of darknet to infer DDoS activities owes much
to the pioneer work carried out by Moore et al. in [6] that
was revisited in [7]. The key observation behind the authors’
technique is that attackers, before executing a DDoS attack,
spoof their addresses using random IPs. Hence, once the attack
is executed, all the victims’ replies (i.e., backscattered packets)
are bounced back to the fake IP addresses, which could be
in the monitored darknet space. Their work is operated by
CAIDA [8], which provide backscattered data for researchers.
Numerous research work has been performed on such data to
analyze DDoS activities. The majority focus on implementing
new detection techniques to infer DDoS attacks [9], tracing-
back the sources of attacks [10], investigating spoofed attacks
[11] and visualizing attacks [12]. Our work is different from
this category as their dataset is only based on reply packets
and do not include request packets such as DNS queries.
Hence, DNS amplified activities may not be inferred using
their approach.
Second, in the area of DNS traffic analysis, the most
related work in this area is rendered by Oberheide et al. [13]
who analyze DNS queries that target darknet sensors. The
authors characterize these traces and propose a mechanism to
implement a secure DNS service on darknet sensors. Moreover,
Paxson [14] is among the first to pinpoint the threats of DNS
reflectors on making DDoS attacks harder to defend. In another
work, Dagon et al. [15] analyze corrupted DNS resolution
paths and pinpoint an increase in malware that modified these
paths and threatened DNS authorities. In comparison to our
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work, Oberheide et al. have not linked or investigated any
DNS DDoS traces through their analysis but solely focused on
analyzing DNS traffic. On the other hand, Paxson and Dagon
et al. did not investigate darknet data. Therefore, all DNS
amplification traces destined to unused IP addresses (darknet)
cannot be detected through their analysis. However, darknet
and other sources of data (i.e., Pasive DNS) could be associated
to extract further intelligence on DNS amplification DDoS
activities such as the approximate number of infections. Future
work could consider the latter task.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide some background information
related to the mechanism of DNS amplification attacks, the
darknet space and DNS queries targeting the darknet.
A. DNS Amplification DDoS Attacks
A DNS amplification attack is a popular form of a DDoS,
in which attackers use publically accessible open DNS servers
to flood a target system with DNS response traffic [3]. The
primary technique consists of an attacker sending a DNS
name lookup request to an open DNS server with the source
address spoofed to be the target’s address. When the DNS
server sends the DNS record response, it is sent instead to the
target. Attackers will typically submit a request for as much
zone information as possible to maximize the amplification
effect. In most attacks of this type, the spoofed queries sent
by the attacker are of the type ANY, which returns all known
information about a DNS zone in a single request. Because
the size of the response is considerably larger than the request,
the attacker is able to increase the amount of traffic directed at
the victim. By leveraging a botnet to produce a large number
of spoofed DNS queries, an attacker can create an immense
amount of traffic with little effort.
B. Darknet Space
In a nutshell, darknet traffic is Internet traffic destined
to routable but unused Internet addresses (i.e., dark sensors).
Since these addresses are unallocated, any traffic targeting
such space is suspicious. Darknet analysis has shown to be an
effective method to generate cyber threat intelligence [16, 17].
Darknet traffic is typically composed of three types of traffic,
namely, scanning, backscattered and misconfiguration [18].
Scanning arises from bots and worms while backscattered
traffic commonly refers to unsolicited traffic that is the re-
sult of responses to DDoS attacks with spoofed source IP
addresses. On the other hand, misconfiguration traffic is due
to network/routing or hardware/software faults causing such
traffic to be sent to the darknet sensors.
C. DNS Queries on Darknet
On the darknet space, we observe a significant number of
DNS queries that could be sent by the following sources:
• Victim of Spoofed IP: In this scenario, the attacker
sends spoofed DNS queries on the Internet address
space using the victim’s IP address. All replies from
the open DNS resolvers will bounce back towards the
victim.
• Compromised Victim: In this scenario, the attacker
uses the victim’s machine to send DNS queries. The
attacker might use several techniques to control the
victim’s machine, including malware infection and/or
vulnerability exploitation. This scenario do not involve
spoofed DNS queries.
• Scanner: In this scenario, the attacker scans the Inter-
net to infer the locations of open DNS resolvers. This
task requires collecting information from the reply
packets and hence, a non-spoofed address is used by
the scanners.
In our work, we assert that high speed ANY DNS queries will
be sent from a victim of spoofed IP or/and compromised victim
but not from a scanner. In other words, scanners might send
ANY DNS queries to the Internet but with low-speed rate to
avoid receiving the amplified flood of replies.
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH
This section presents and elaborates on our proposed
approach that aims at inferring DNS amplification DDoS
activities by leveraging darknet data. The approach exploits the
idea of analyzing DNS queries that target the darknet space
that were originally intended by the attacker to reach Internet
open DNS resolvers. The approach takes as input darknet traffic
and outputs inferred DNS amplification DDoS insights. It is
based on 2 components, namely, the detection and the rate
classification components. We discuss these components in
what follows.
A. Detection Component
The detection component takes as input darknet traffic and
outputs DNS amplification DDoS flows. A flow is defined as
a series of consecutive packets sharing the same source IP
address targeting darknet addresses. To achieve the detection
task, we base our detection component on analyzing DNS
queries targeting darknet addresses. These DNS queries are
attempts towards port 53. In order to detect DNS amplification
DDoS, we built our approach in accordance with the param-
eters of Table I. In this work, we build on top of [7] that
Parameter Value
Packet Count > 25
Scanned Hosts > 25
DNS Query Type ANY
Requested Domain Found in Root DNS DB
TABLE I: DNS amplified DDoS Identification Parameters
inferred DDoS from darknet; we use 25 as a threshold for both
the packet count and scanned hosts. This permits the filtering
of misconfiguration traffic (i.e., a host sending many packets
to only 1 unused IP address). Moreover, this verifies that the
inferred DNS amplified attempts involve at least 25 distinct
open DNS resolvers. Note that, we could have also added
other parameters such as attack-duration and packet-rate
to our detection component. However, we avoid using time-
based constraints; we have detected some flash attempts [19]
that targeted thousands of distinct unused IPs within seconds
and other stealthy scanning activities [20] that persisted for
several weeks.
In summary, our detection component labels a flow of
traffic as a DNS amplification DDoS attack if it has sent at
least 25 DNS query of type ANY to distinct unused dark IP
addresses. Further, the flow must have requested domains that
exist in our root and TLD database.
B. Rate Classification Component
The rate of the attack is one of the major characteristics
of DDoS activities [7]. After inferring DNS amplification
flows, we noticed the existence of a large deviation among
DNS amplification DDoS attack rates. For example, some
flow rates reached more than 50 thousand packets per second
(pps) whereas others were below 1 pps. Therefore, in order to
understand more this large deviation and to group attacks per
attack rates, we executed a rate classification exercise based
on the values found in Table II. We have chosen a threshold of
Attack Rate
Category
Value (pps)
Low rate ≤ 0.5
Medium 0.5 < rate < 4700
High rate ≥ 4700
TABLE II: Attack Classification per Rate
0.5 pps to differentiate between low and medium attacks. This
value is used in [7]. However, instead of neglecting such low
rate attacks, similar to what [7] did, we adopt and exploit this
value to detect a sub-category of attacks; stealthy attempts [20],
which consists of slow scans that are generally hard to detect
through flow-based detection and intrusion detection systems.
In regards to high attack rate, this category contains high rate
attempts that are commonly referred to as flash attacks [19].
We have chosen a threshold of 4700 pps, which is the average
rate of the Slammer worm propagation [19], to differentiate
between medium and high rate attacks. In this exercise, we
assume that the average rate of the fastest worm propagation
in 2003 will have, at least, similar rates as flash attacks in
2013. Please note that in general, worm propagation performs
scans for vulnerabilities on hosts in an attempt to exploit or
infect the victims. In comparison to the DNS amplification
DDoS attempts, the attackers generate a similar portsweep
propagation attempts to detect open DNS resolvers and execute
the attack in one shot. The latter technique does not aim
at searching for a vulnerability to exploit, but instead sends
benign DNS ANY queries to abuse the open DNS resolver
services and amplify the reply on a victim.
V. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
The evaluation is based on a real darknet dataset during a
3 months period, namely, February, March and April, 2013.
In general, we possess real darknet data that we receive on
a daily basis from a trusted third party. The darknet sensors
monitor /13 address blocks (i.e., ≈ half a million dark IPs).
The analyzed data consists of an average of 720 GB of one-
way communications to unused IPs. In regards to our char-
acterization tasks, we used several network-based monitoring
and statistical tools such as TCPdump. We abide and closely
follow the steps of our proposed approach that was discussed
in Section IV to elaborate on our analysis, which is based on
three main elements, namely, the characterization and a case
study. In total, our approach identified a total of 134 DNS
amplification DDoS attacks including high-speed, medium and
stealthy attacks.
A. DNS Amplification DDoS Characterization
In this section, we present the overall DNS amplification
DDoS statistics related to our analyzed dataset. The overall
DNS queries distribution is shown in Figure 1. The outcome
clearly fingerprints the largest DNS amplified DDoS attack
that occurred in March 2013 [5]. On the other hand, in order
to have a closer look at this attack, we depict Figure 2 that
illustrates the distribution of the queries for the month of
March. The average DNS queries arrival time per hour is
approximately 58050 packets. Obviously, several large-scale
DNS Amplified DDoS attacks caused some peaks at some
periods such as at hours 340, 400 and 517 in which the
distribution of packets was raised to 503995, 686774 and
798192 packets, respectively. More explanation on these peaks
are discussed in Section V-B.
1) Query Type Distribution: In order to understand the
types of DNS queries received on our dark space, we list
in Table III the DNS query type distribution of the analyzed
dataset. As expected, the vast majority of these are ANY
queries. Note that the top 4 records are the same for the entire
3 months period. Further, in contrast with the results in 2007
by [13], that found that ANY records scored only 0.0199% of
the entire perceived records, we record 52.23% as observed
on the darknet space. As a result, we can safely assume that
the recent trend of DNS amplification attacks are behind the
increase of ANY records found on the darknet in the current
year [5].
February Packet
Count (%)
March Packet
Count (%)
April Packet
Count (%)
10047038
A (49.02%)
27649274
ANY (64.23%)
18378685
ANY (54.60%)
7763817
ANY (37.88%)
11310058
A (26.28%)
11595908
A (34.45%)
2479572
TXT (12.10%)
2459257
TXT (5.71%)
3402073
TXT (10.11%)
100463
MX (0.49%)
500143
MX (1.16%)
180779
MX (0.54%)
29232
PTR (0.14%)
63340
RRSIG (0.15%)
28716
AAAA (0.09%)
TABLE III: Top 5 DNS Query Type Distribution of 3 Months Period
2) Requested Domains: In our analysis, we found that
Root is the most requested domain name as perceived by the
monitored darknet. Recall that attackers will typically submit a
request for as much zone information as possible to maximize
the amplification effect. Note that, from our data, the second
top requested domain belongs to one of the largest Internet-
scale DNS operators.
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Fig. 1: DNS Queries Distribution of February, March and April 2013
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Fig. 2: DNS Queries Distribution of March 2013
Victim Requested
Domain
Name
Detection
Period
Analyzed
Attack
Duration
(second)
Intensity
(packet)
Contacted
Unique
Dark IPs
Avg.
Packet
Size
(Bytes)
Avg.
Rate
(pps)
Rate
Category
M1 B March 15 34605 3176785 360683 68.00 91.80 Medium
M2 B March 17 to 18 93508 14464427 360705 68.00 154.69 Medium
TABLE IV: DNS Amplification DDoS Traces
B. Case Study
Out of the 134 detected attacks, we discuss in this section
one of the major case studies that belong to a medium
speed attack. The latter is one of the major inferred DNS
amplification DDoS in terms of size and impact. This attack
targeted one victim using 2 hosts (ID M1 and M2 of Table IV).
This attack scanned around 360000 unique dark IPs (68% of
the monitored /13 darknet), and hence could be considered the
most comprehensive compared to all other threats. Our analysis
linked these traces to the largest DNS amplification DDoS [5]
for the following reasons: 1) in addition to the use of the ANY
DNS query , the traces of this attack targeted the ”‘ripe.net”’
domain name; this domain was used in the largest DDoS as
declared in a blog posted by the victim [5]; 2) the timing of the
traces from the host with ID 1 started on March 15th, whereas
those of the host with ID 2 started on March 17th. The two
mentioned dates could be found in the media [21, 22] and
were posted on Twitter on March 17th by a company support
personnel [23]. In order to depict this distributed attack, in
Figure 2, we highlighted the threat using a colored dashed-line.
The first or/and second peaks are likely performed as testing
before actually executing the largest DDoS as demonstrated by
the third peak. Our result match the ascending order of peaks
as discussed by the victims [5]. This case study is probably
sent by an attacker using spoofed IP address of the victims
or using compromised machines; we unlikely consider these
activities as scanning events that are using legitimate addresses
(i.e., the intention is not to DDoS themselves but other targeted
victims).
In addition to performing several validation of our results
through DShield and the media, we execute a renowned
Network Intrusion and Detection System (NIDS) (i.e., Snort)
on the whole traces to see if we can detect such malicious
activities. The NIDS labeled 129 out of the inferred 134 (96%)
DNS amplification DDoS as executing filtered portsweep
probes. We have found that the 5 undetected attacks refer
to the low-speed (stealthy) attacks, which are, by default,
undetectable using a typical NIDS. In summary, we can claim
that our approach that aims at inferring DNS amplification
DDoS yielded zero false negative in comparison with a leading
NIDS. Further, our approach, leveraging the darknet space, can
infer DNS amplified DDoS activities while a NIDS is limited
to pinpointing scanning attempts.
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
From this work, we can extract the following insights
related to DNS amplification attacks: First, when compared
to previous years, we have found that the DNS amplifica-
tion attacks are behind the increase of DNS queries of type
ANY on the Internet. Second, we have pinpointed that the
majority of the attacks target the root domain. Third, we have
encountered that DNS amplified attack rates can range from
very low to high speeds. High speeds attacks pinpoint victims
of spoofed attacks and compromised machines whereas the
very slow attacks reflects stealthy scans. Last but not least,
we have unexpectedly uncover a UDP-based mechanism used
by DNS amplification attackers to execute DNS amplification
attacks in a highly rapid manner without collecting information
about open DNS resolvers. Further, more importantly, we
have inferred that unlike typical DDoS attempts that scan for
vulnerable machines and then execute the attack, the largest
DNS amplification analyzed was executed in only one step;
DNS queries are sent to the Internet with the intention to reach
open DNS resolvers, which subsequently trigger an amplified
reply to the victim.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work presented a new approach to infer Internet DNS
Amplification Denial of Service activities by leveraging the
darknet space. The approach corroborated the fact that one can
infer DDoS attacks without relying on backscattered analysis.
The detection module is based on certain parameters to finger-
print network flows as DNS amplification DDoS related. The
classification module amalgamates the attacks based on their
possessed rate. The analysis was based on 720 GB of real
darknet traffic collected during a recent 3 months period. The
results disclose 134 DNS amplified DDoS activities, including
flash and stealthy attacks. Moreover, the case study provided
significant cyber security intelligence related to the largest
DNS amplification attack. As for future work, we aim to
execute our model on a larger data set and implement our
proposed approach in a near real-time fashion.
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